Using a broad sample of multiple commodity-inputs industries over the period of 1994-2008, the paper investigates the determinants for corporate decisions to commodity hedge and for the extent of hedging separately. Consistent with the literature, I find that firms are more likely to hedge when they are big, have risk management department set up and have more of their competitors hedge. I also find that firms change dynamically from non-hedgers to hedgers when their financial conditions improve. Furthermore, the paper investigates what determines the extent of hedging conditional on hedging and the cross-sectional and time series deviation of their hedge ratios. I find that firms with high-risk-preference CEOs tend to hedge less, are more likely to respond to past commodity price growth and to hedge differently from the industry average. Contrary to the general literature, the paper provides evidence that firms make decisions to hedge and to the extent of hedging based on distinct factors. The main determinants for the decisions to hedge are firms' financial conditions, while the main determinants for the extent to hedge are CEO's risk preferences.
I. Introduction
The corporate risk management literature has increased in popularity for the past two decades as derivative markets develop. Many studies focus on the rationales for firms' hedging and suggest several reasons that firms should hedge: hedging relieves under-/overinvestment costs 1 , decreases financial distress costs 2 , reduces taxes 3 and decreases agency . Despite all the rationales the literature suggests, less than 50% of firms hedge in any type of hedging, less than 30% of firms hedge commodity exposures and the average hedge ratio 5 among the firms that do hedge is less than 30%.
Although many studies have dedicated to risk management determinants, it is still
unclear what drives firms to hedge and how much to hedge. Part of the reason of the lack of a consensus is the lack of broad data on hedging, especially across-industry commodity hedging. To address these questions, I examine the hedging policies of 579 firms in 10 industry groups over the period of [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Specifically, the paper investigates the factors that associate with firms' decisions to hedge and the extent to hedge conditional on hedging.
The paper also investigates the dynamic change from non-hedgers to hedgers for the first time and studies what drives firms to hedge differently from their competitors and closely examines the hedging policies for different industries.
1 See Smith and Stulz (1985) , Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) , Lin and Smith (2003) , and many others 2 See Haushalter (2000) , Rogers (2002) and Dionne and Garand (2003) , etc 3 See Smith and Stulz (1985) , Tufano (1996) , Graham and Smith (1999) , Graham and Rogers (2002), etc 4 See Tufano (1996) , Stulz (1990) , Triki (2004 Triki ( , 2005 , etc 5 Hedge ratio is defined as notional dollar amount hedged divided by last year's exposure.
I find that firms are more likely to hedge when they are bigger, hedge other type of exposures 6 and when a larger portion of their competitors hedges. On the other hand, firms that do not hedge are the smaller firms, with less debt, but higher KZ measures and lower profitability 7
. The results suggest that those firms do not hedge because they do not have enough financial resources to develop a risk management department or to find counterparties for the derivative contracts. I also find that firms are more likely to hedge for the first time if their KZ index decreases, debt rating increases or profitability increases. It suggests that firms start to hedge when their financial situations improve and allow them to set up a hedging program.
On the determinants for the extent to hedge, I find that firms tend to hedge less when they have younger CEOs and have more options in their compensation plan. I also find that when determining the hedge ratio, firms with young CEOs and higher option compensation are more likely to respond to past commodity price growth and to deviate from industry average. The results suggest that managerial risk preference play an important role in setting up the extent of hedging. The paper provides evidence that the main determining factors for the decisions to hedge and the extent to hedge are different. Firms decide whether to hedge based on their financial status and decide how much to hedge according to their risk preferences.
6 "Hedge other type" is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm hedge interest rate or exchange rate. It is a proxy for setting up the risk management department. 7 In general lower leverage ratio could indicate more financial flexibility. However, together with a higher KZ index, lower debt rating and lower profitability, less debt is more likely to be a signal that the firms are financially constrained and cannot acquire enough debt.
This paper supports several explanations for corporate risk management. First, firms in weak financial situation are less likely to hedge, which is consistent with fixed cost of setting up hedging program and inaccessibility in the derivative market. Consistent with the notion,
Haushalter (2000) and Gé czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find a positive correlation between the decision to hedge and total assets. Second, the correlation between firms'
hedging activities and managerial risk aversion is consistent with the stream of literature showing that firms' hedging decisions are related to managerial stock and option compensation. For example, Tufano (1996) , Rajgopal and Shelvin (2002) and Rogers (2002) find that managers with higher options holdings hedge less because options compensation create a convex relation between the managers' utility and the firm's value. But on the other hand, Carpenter (2000), Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) and Gé czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find the opposite relationship between stock options compensation and hedge ratio.
Carpenter (2000) argues that managers hedge more with more options holdings in order to avoid large drop in stock price, which makes their options holdings less valuable. The results in the paper support the first set of literature and show that CEOs with higher risk appetite-younger CEOs and CEOs with higher options compensation tend to hedge less.
The paper is closely related to Haushalter (2000) that studies the hedging policies of oil and gas producers between 1992 and 1994. He also separately examines the determinants of decision to hedge and the extent of hedging. Similar to Haushalter (2000) , I find that the determinants of whether to hedge and how much to hedge are very different. My study has three important distinctions from his work and the rest of the literature. First, I have a relative long sample period of 1994 to 2008. It allows me to directly test what drives the firms' dynamic changes from non-hedgers in the past to hedgers. I find that firms are more likely to hedge for the first time when they increase their leverage, their debt ratings and profitability improve and when the concentration in industry increases. The results suggest that firms start to hedge when the benefit of hedging increases and when their ability to hedge increases. The long sample period also allows me to test whether the extent of hedging changes according to past commodity price growth. I find that firms increase the amount they hedge when past commodity price increases and firms with young CEO and more option compensation tend to respond to past commodity price growth.
The second distinction is that, unlike other studies, this study has multiple industry samples, which allows me to analyze the between-industry difference on why firms do not hedge. The paper tests the determinants of firms whose hedge ratios deviate from industry average. I find that firms with young CEOs and higher option compensation ratio in low
Herfindahl industry tend to hedge less even when their competitors hedge more. The results suggest that those CEOs tend to be over-confident with less risk aversion. It also suggests that firms are more likely to hedge less in a highly competitive industry with a low Herfindahl index because they are subject to less predation risk in those industries.
Third, most the studies use Tobit model 8 to examine the determinants of the decisions to hedge, while others use Cragg model 9
. Although the Tobit model has received extensive use in hedge ratio analysis, it has the restriction that the same factors are assumed to affect 88 For example, Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002) 9 See Haushalter (2000) the probability of hedging and the magnitude of the hedge in the same way given that a hedge is conducted. In the Cragg model, it is assumed that the probability of hedging and hedge ratio regressions are assumed to be independent. This assumption is somewhat unrealistic. To address the above issues, I use a Heckman selection model, which allows the variables affecting each decision to differ, but does not require that the two equations be independent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and the methodology used to analyze the determinants of hedging. Section III examines the determinants of firms' decisions to hedge and analyzes what drives firms' dynamic decisions of changing from non-hedgers to hedgers. Section IV analyzes the determinants of the extent to hedge conditional on hedging and examines why firms choose to hedge less when the competitors hedge more. Section V concludes the paper with a discussion.
II. Data and methodology

A. Data
The sample consists of manufacturing and airline industries which have hedgeable commodities as significant inputs components. I identify industries with commodity inputs using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark input-output tables in 2002.
I rank the percentage of commodity usage in each industry's total inputs, where commodities are defined as 30 hedgable commodities traded on the Chicago Merchandise Exchange, the , (3) firms with negative sales or asset data during the sample period, (4) industries with only one firm. After applying the above rules, I
obtain the final sample of 579 firms, 6276 firm-year observations. I compare the characteristics of the final sample used in this paper, of all manufacturing firms and of all
Compustat firms. The summary statistics of different samples are reported in Appendix B.
The final sample used in the paper consists of more mature and larger firms, firms with lower R&D expenses, higher financial constraints and higher industry concentration.
Hedging data are hand collected with keyword searching in 10-K forms from SEC EDGAR. The keywords used include: "hedg", "derivative", "market risk" and "raw material". Then the paragraph around the keywords is read to identify whether it is a hedge, what kind of hedge it is
11
, what kind of derivatives they use, the notional value and the fair value of the hedge if available. A natural hedge is identified when a firm states in the filings that it uses long-term contracts with either supplier or consumers to fix the price for at least 10 I discuss the potential survival bias by restricting firms with five years data in section IV. Generally, including only firms who survive for three years after a shock underestimates the results of predation because the exiting firms are more likely to be the target of predation and those firms tend to be financially constrained and unhedged. 11 I classify hedges into interest rate hedge, exchange rate hedge and commodity hedge. 
B. Methodology
In order to separately examine corporate decisions to hedge and extent of hedging, two- shows that firms are more likely to hedge when more of their competitors are doing so.
Other variables used in this chapter are defined as follows. Size is the market value at the end of each year. Age is the years since it first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets.
14 Haushalter (2000) and Gé czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find a positive correlation between the decision to hedge and total assets. Haushalter (2000) also find that firm size is less important in determining hedge ratio.
15 Nian (2004) and Adam and Nian (2008) Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Long term debt is the long term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá -Requejo, (2001) To examine the effects of past commodity prices on hedge ratio, the following regressions are conducted.
[ | ]
Where is firms' hedge ratio at time t; is the commodity price growth rate at time t-1; is a vector of control variables, including leverage, KZ, debt rating, investment, ROA, dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of tax loss carry forward, young CEO dummy, stock compensation ratio and option compensation ratio.
is the binary variable of whether firms hedge predicted in the first stage of Heckman model.
is a vector of instrumental variables defined in chapter 2. is the interaction terms of firms' characteristics and past commodity price growth rates. The interaction terms capture the determinants for firms to deviate from their optimal hedge ratio according to the past commodity price growth rate.
To examine the effects of industry average hedge ratio on firms' hedge ratio, the following regressions are conducted.
Where is firms' hedge ratio at time t; is the average hedge ratio in industry j except firm i at time t-1; is a vector of control variables, including leverage, KZ, debt rating, investment, ROA, dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of tax loss carry forward, young CEO dummy, stock compensation ratio and option compensation ratio. is the binary variable of whether firms hedge predicted in the first stage of Heckman model. is a vector of instrumental variables defined in chapter 2.
is the interaction terms of firms' characteristics and industry hedge ratio.
The interaction terms capture the determinants for firms to choose different hedge ratio from its industry average.
III. The determinants to hedge
The results on corporate decisions to hedge are reported in Table 5 . Firm size, debt ratio, debt rating, and stock compensation ratio are positively correlated with corporate decisions to hedge, while KZ index, rating less than BBB dummy and Herfindahl are negatively correlated with probability of hedging. The results are consistent with the majority of the literature that bigger firms with higher leverage are more likely to hedge.
In addition to the results which are consistent with previous literature, I also find that
Other Hedge dummy, which is 1 when firms ever hedge other type of exposure in the past, are positively related to firms' likelihood of hedge. It suggests that firms with established risk management program are more likely to hedge commodity exposure too. Furthermore, I
find the percentage of hedgers in an industry positively affects firms' decisions to hedge, which indicates a spillover effect on corporate decisions to hedge.
Among all the determinants, firm size, the percentage of hedgers in industry and debt rating are the top three important characteristics. About 24-35% of variation in probability of hedging is explained in the model. It is consistent with the view that the firms do not hedge when they are in the very weak financial situation that they do not have enough financial recourses to set up the hedging program.
All independent variables are measured at t-1. Model (3)- (4) include industry and year effects and Model (5)- (6) include industry by year effects. All models report T-stats calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level.
All the independent variables in Heckman second stage (Equation 4, Table 8 ) are included together with the four instrument variables in . Some of the variables have no explanatory power and are not reported. Table 6 reports the results for the dynamic changes of firms from non-hedgers to hedgers for the first time. Results show that when their debt ratio, debt rating, return of assets and stock compensation ratio increases at time t-1, and when the KZ index and option compensation ratio decreases at time t-1, the firms are more likely to start to hedge for the first time at time t. Among all the determinants, debt rating and return of assets increase are the most important factors associated with the change from non-hedgers to hedgers. It suggests that firms would start to hedge if their credit rating and profitability are better than before. The results indicate that the weak financial situation might be the main reason why firms cannot hedge.
IV. The extent to hedge
Another important risk management policy, in addition to whether to hedge, is to decide how much to hedge. In this chapter, I investigate the factors that associate with the extent of corporate risk management.
Among all the studies that focus on the determinants of corporate risk management, less than 50% of the studies use a continuous measure of hedging 16 . Other than data availability, another important reason for the lack of continuous measure is that the gross notional value of hedging derivatives might overestimate the risk management activities when the firms hold offsetting contracts. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) point out an additional 16 See the review in Triki (2005) problem in the gross notional value for foreign exchange rate hedging. They emphasize that firms do not report derivatives holdings by individual currency and seem first to net positions on these currencies before aggregating them.
The data sample in my paper has advantages to overcome these concerns on using gross notional value as a measure of the extent of hedging. 1996) , which analyzes the hedging activities in the gold mining industry in 1986.
Furthermore, I find that the hedge ratio 17 is positively correlated with past commodity price growth rate. The firms with young CEO and higher option compensation are more likely to form their hedge ratios according to the past commodity price growth. It suggests that firms may deviate inversely from the optimal hedge ratio 18 according to past commodity price growth and managers with higher risk appetite are more likely to deviate. I also find that firms' hedge ratio is higher when the average hedge ratio in industry 19 is higher. It suggests that there is a spillover effect on the extent of hedging. The results are also consistent with the notion that competition in the product market affects corporate risk management 20 .
A. The extent of hedging
The results of the extent of hedging are reported in Table 8 empirical evidence on the positive correlation between stock option compensation and risk taking. So, the results suggest that managerial risk preferences play an important role when setting up hedging policies on the extent of hedging, which is different from the decision to hedge, where the most important determinants are firms' ability to hedge.
In addition to the results which are consistent with previous literature, I also find that PastCom, which is the past commodity price growth is positively related to the extent of hedging. It suggests that, in general, firms tend to increase their hedge ratio when they observe an increase in commodity price in the previous period. Assuming there is only one optimal hedge ratio for firms with certain characteristics, the results suggest that firms adjust the hedge ratio based on their expectations of future commodity prices. It is consistent with the notion that firms may speculate when setting up the amount of hedging 21 .
I also find that firms tend to hedge more when the industry average hedge ratio is higher. It indicates a spillover effect not only on the decisions to hedge, but also on the extent of hedging.
Among all the determinants, past commodity price growth, the industry average hedge ratio and return of assets are the top three important characteristics, followed by young CEO dummy and option compensation ratio. So, the results suggest that managerial risk preferences play an important role when setting up hedging policies on the extent of hedging, which is different from the decision to hedge, where the most important determinants are firms' ability to hedge.
21 See Adam and Fernando (2006) and Faulkender (2005) for further evidence on hedging and speculation.
All independent variables are measured at t-1. Model (1)-(2) include year effects; Model (3)-(4) include industry and year effects and Model (5)- (6) include industry by year effects.
All models report T-stats calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level.
B. The extent of hedging and past commodity price growth
If the hypothesis that firms with high risk appetite managers tend to hedge less is true, I
should find the interaction term of past commodity price growth and young CEOs and the interaction term of past commodity price growth and option compensation ratio are significantly different from zero. On the other hand, it the hypothesis is true, I should also find the interaction terms of past commodity price growth and measures of firms' financial situations are not significantly different from zero. Table 9 reports the results for model 5 with the interaction term of past commodity price growth and firms' characteristics. I find that the firms with young CEOs and have higher option compensation ratio decrease their hedge ratios when they observe the past commodity price increases. Firms also tend to inversely respond to past commodity price growth when they are in competitive industries, though the coefficients are only significant at 10% confidence level. Younger CEOs usually are less risk averse compared to older CEOs because they are in the early stage of their life cycles. The managers with higher option compensation prefer extra volatility of the cash flow and the stock price of the firms.
So, their preferences for higher risk make them over confident and develop their hedge ratio according to their expectation to the future commodity prices, based on the past commodity price growth.
It is noteworthy to mention that firms' financial constraint measures, leverage and debt rating and profitability do not affect whether firms deviate their hedge ratios according to the past commodity growth rate. The only significant characteristics that affect firms' hedge ratio deviation on the past commodity growth rate are the young CEO dummy and the option compensation ratio. It indicates that managerial risk preference is the main reason why firms deviates their hedge ratio according to past commodity price growth.
C. The extent of hedging and industry average hedge ratio
If the hypothesis that firms with high risk appetite managers hedge less and be overconfident is true, I should find the interaction term of and young CEOs and the interaction term of industry average hedge ratio and option compensation ratio are significantly less than zero. On the other hand, it the hypothesis is true, I should also find the interaction terms of past commodity price growth and measures of firms' financial situations are not significantly less than zero. Table 10 reports the results for model 6 with the interaction term of industry average hedge ratio and firms' characteristics. It shows that the firms with higher debt rating, young CEO and have higher option compensation ratio tend to be independent from the industry average hedge ratio. Younger CEOs usually are less risk averse compared to older CEOs growth does not significantly affect the hedge ratio. Option compensation ratios are significant for all industries, except for airline industry.
D. Industry specific results
The results show that there exist a great amount of heteroskedasticity in industries and the industry effects are necessary to control for industry specific results. To distinguish firm effects from industry effects, firm fixed effect regressions on the extent of hedging are conducted industry by industry. The results are reported in Table 13 . Firm fixed effect regressions show similar results to the Tobit regressions with lower statistical significance.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, I investigate the factors that associate with the decisions to and the extent of corporate risk management. The data sample in my paper has advantages to overcome the concerns on using gross notional value as a measure of the extent of hedging. I find that firms are more likely to hedge when they are bigger, hedge other type of exposures and when a larger portion of their competitors hedges. On the other hand, firms that do not hedge are the smaller firms, with less debt, but higher KZ measures and lower profitability. In general lower leverage ratio could indicate more financial flexibility. However, together with a higher KZ index, lower debt rating and lower profitability, less debt is more likely to be a signal that the firms are financially constrained and cannot acquire enough debt.
The results suggest that those firms do not hedge because they do not have enough financial resources to develop a risk management department or to find counterparties for the derivative contracts. I also find that firms are more likely to hedge for the first time if their KZ index decreases, debt rating increases or profitability increases. It suggests that firms start to hedge when their financial situations improve and allow them to set up a hedging program.
Bibliography Table 1. List of industry groups and summary of hedging policies
The table lists the sample of industry groups at 2-digit SIC level in the paper. Number of firms is the average number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Herfindahl index is the sum of squared market share in 3-digit-SIC industry. Natural hedge is identified when a firm states in the filings that it uses long-term contracts with either supplier or consumers to fix the price for at least one year. R&D expense is scaled by sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Long term debt is the long term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá -Requejo, (2001) formula. Operating profit margin is the gross income divided by total sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Number of firms is the number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. The table shows Probit regressions of decisions on commodity hedging. OtherHe is dummy variable that equals to 1 when firms ever hedge other type of exposure in the past. # Hedgers in industry is percentage number of firms that hedge in the industry except firm itself. Rating is the index of debt rating, with 0 means no rating, 1 means under C, 21 means AAA, etc. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.
(1) Table 2 . All independent variables are measured as changes at t-1 except for age, # hedgers in industry and Young CEO dummy. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. Table 2 and 3. All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The table shows second stage Heckman selection regressions of firms' hedge ratio. PastCom is the commodity price growth rate at t-1. AveHe is the average hedge ratio in industry. Other variables are defined in Table 2 . All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.
(1) Table 2 and 3. All independent variables are demeaned and measured at t-1. All models report Tstats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. Table 2 and 3. All independent variables are demeaned and measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. Table 2 and 3. All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) Table 2 and 3. All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Cotton industry, when quarterly hedges are reported, the annual hedge ratio is defined as the average of quarterly hedge ratios. For example, if the company reports "we hedge 44%, 23%, 4%
and 1% of its anticipated aircraft fuel consumption for the first, second, third and fourth quarters of 2007", the total notional value for its 2007 hedge is 18% (= ).
The same average method is used when the reported notional (fair) value is the dollar value of the contracts in other industries. When firms report notional (fair) value separately for different commodities, for example copper, aluminum and zinc for metal industries, the total value is recorded. When firms report notional (fair) value separately for different contracts, for example forward, collar and options, the total value is recorded. The firm is defined as option hedge user if it uses options, collar or cap contracts. The realized gain or loss is recorded as gain in the current year instead of unrealized gain or loss.
Appendix B Summary statistics of different samples
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviations of firm and industry characteristics of all firms in Compustat, all manufacturing firms and the final sample used in the paper. Size is the market value at the end of each year. Age is the years since it first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment divided by the total asset. KZ index is defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá -Requejo, (2001) formula.
Operating profit margin is the gross income divided by total sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Number of firms is the number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction (referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the derivatives gain or loss is initially reported as a component of other comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings.
The ineffective portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately.
For a derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income (outside earnings) as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale security. Similarly, the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction.
For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change.
